ABSTRACT As mobile devices are increasingly used in various daily activities, they have become a movable storage that stores various personal/business information of users. Most mobile OSes, including Android, store personal data in databases and provide APIs for apps, which can be used to access a database managed by the system or to manage its own database. However, Android, which is our main focus here, stores data as plaintext in its database; as a result, the database content can be leaked unintentionally through several vulnerabilities. Additionally, the responsibility for the security of the database content created by an app lies with the developer of the app, while the mobile OS only provides minimal security features, such as isolation and access control. In this paper, we propose a security architecture to construct a secure database environment on Android. To this end, we entirely separate the database system from the app domain-to the best of our knowledge, this is the first such design for localized mobile databases. The separated database system manages a database with encryption; hence, data are no longer stored as plaintext. By delivering the responsibility over the system, this separation enables app developers to be free from the difficult task of managing the security of the database. The proposed system also provides tight access control over a database by using a runtime information of an app. Note that the current access control of Android is based on the Linux uid of an app. Thus, access is granted to a database if the app has the correct uid, regardless of the identity of the app. That is, our method creates a one-to-one pairing between the app and its database, and ensures that database access is granted only to the owner app. Additionally, we propose a similarity comparison method that helps to determine whether a new app is an updated of a previous version; this improves upon the current method, which relies only on a signature check and the package name of the app. To evaluate the feasibility of the proposed architecture, we conduct a series of experiments on our prototype implementation. The results show that the proposed secure database architecture is feasible with acceptable overhead.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, mobile devices have largely replaced personal computers as the reference platform to carry out daily activities. With the increase in usage of mobile devices, the amount of personal/business data stored in mobile devices has increased accordingly. These data are commonly stored as files or databases. Thus, a mobile OS provides several data storage APIs to store data. In particular, a database can efficiently manage an organized data set; thus, most Android applications (we use application/app interchangeably in this document), including default applications such as Contacts, Calendar, and SMS, utilize databases to store data. Because personal/business data on mobile devices may include confidential information, major mobile OSes offer various encryption functionalities such as per-file encryption and full disk encryption. Google introduced Full Disk Encryption (FDE) from Android 3.0 onwards. FDE provides on-the-fly encryption and decryption that operates under the filesystem for all read/write operations on the device.
However, FDE protects the data only when the data are encrypted. When a user unlocks an Android device, all data in the device are decrypted. That is, FDE protects the data against off-line attacks on a locked device but not against attacks during operation. On an unlocked device, anyone with FIGURE 1. E-mail database of Android N. Login IDs and passwords exist as plaintext. We hid sensitive information.
FIGURE 2.
Static passwords in the code on Samsung Pay database [1] .
the proper permissions can access and manipulate all data in the database even if FDE is applied. Figure 1 presents the content of an E-mail database, which is displayed using the SQLite Database Browser [2] after being extracted from the FDE-enabled Android Device (Android N). This database stores account information (ID and Password, red boxes in Figure 1 ) to interwork with the e-mail server as plaintext. That is, Android stores sensitive personal information in the database as plaintext; as a result, anyone who has direct access to the database file can obtain these database content.
As mentioned above, FDE alone can not protect the data from exposure. To protect the data stored in the database while developing an Android application (user app or system app), developers must implement a self-solution for database encryption or use a third-party library. Because app developers work mostly in the application domain, they face some limitations that cannot be easily overcome. One such limitations is key management.
Most apps that include encryption solutions require a user to enter a password to generate a secret key to be used for encryption/decryption. Otherwise, hard-coded secret information for key generation is used to avoid the inconvenience of entering a password every time. If an app requires a password from a user, the user must enter a password each time an app is launched, which is a great inconvenience. If an app uses hard-coded secret information or device-specific information (e.g. DeviceID, MAC address) for key generation, there is a risk that such information will be exposed by reverse engineering. In addition, this approach can have a significant ripple effect, because the exposed confidential information might be equally applied to all devices. For example, Samsung Pay uses secret information in the application code to generate an encryption key for credit card information, which was revealed in [1] . KakaoTalk, a widely used messenger in Korea, encrypts and stores a list of friends and conversations in a database; nonetheless, the data stored in the KakaoTalk database was exposed through static analysis [3] .
As the associations between mobile devices and daily activities, including business, have increased, the demand for remedies to securely store sensitive data of users has increased. However, most studies on protecting private information in Android have focused on the information generated by Android and not the sensitive information generated by third-party apps. From a user's perspective, the personal information produced by third parties must also be securely protected, and a systematic protection method for such information is required.
In this paper, we propose an architecture for a secure database environment on Android. The contributions of our work are as follows.
1) The proposed security architecture protects sensitive information in databases, including databases for thirdparty apps. FDE can not protect the database from exposure, because an attacker, who can access the database file, is able to see database content stored in plaintext. Furthermore, for a database system in the application domain, an attacker can acquire crucial information related to an encryption key by simply analyzing a restricted domain range only. To remedy these security breaches, we entirely separate the database management system from the application domain. The separated database management system encrypts a database with a key that is managed by itself. Plaintext no longer exists in the database, and no key material can be revealed by reverse engineering of the app domain. As a result, developers do not need to manage the security of databases in the process of developing apps, because the separated database system manages the security. Our architecture covers not only default Android databases but also databases of third-party applications. It operates transparently on the current system and is robust even for the root attacker. 2) Current Android controls database access based on the Linux uid of an app. It is possible for a developer to make two applications share the same uid so that the two applications are able to access each other's database files. While this sharing method is helpful to conserve system resources, it may cause a security and privacy flaw. It is difficult for users to know which apps have the same uid; moreover, users have no controls over this arrangement. In addition, an attacker with root privileges can manipulate the uid to gain access to a target database. In response, we propose one-to-one paring between the owner app and its database. To this end, we use the runtime information of an app to obtain a fingerprint of the app, which is unique. This tight pairing prevents an app for accessing a database owned by other app, even if it possesses the uid of the owner app. 3) We implement a prototype of our proposed system for Android 7.0 (Nougat). We incorporate our changes as an optional feature (i.e., database without encryption is still available). 4) We analyze the security and performance of the proposed schemes on a real device and perform a series of experiments. We measure the overhead introduced by the SQL operations in our architecture. We also observe changes in overhead caused by increasing the number of concurrent processes that execute the SQL operations. Our experimental results show that our security architecture provides functionalities to protect database access securely and stably, with acceptable overhead. 5) We also propose a method to check if the update process is correct, i.e., to check if the updated version is actually updated from a previous version. Because an app could be updated frequently, security architectures such as ours should carefully identify the app during an update process. The current system verifies the signature and the package name of the app before updating an app. If the developer is the same, the signature of apps are verified with the same certificate. The package name is simply an alias assigned by the developer. So, we strongly believe that more comparisons in the strict sense will be needed in the future to ensure that a new app is an update of a previous version. To this end, we propose an app similarity comparison method, which can be processed in a local device. Our method could be utilized to strengthen the relationship between two apps (previous and updated app), and eventually, between an app and its database. To evaluate the feasibility of our comparison method, we collect a set of apps of different versions and calculate similarity scores for each pair. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II covers background on related Android system features. Section III provides a discussion on related work, and Section IV presents our threat model and assumptions. In Section V, we describe our security architecture. We present our proposed similarity method in Section VI. In Section VII, we provide a security analysis and performance evaluation. Section VIII discusses several issues and limitations. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section IX.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. SELINUX & SEANDROID
SELinux [4] is an access control mechanism that works alongside with the Linux regular access controls. It is an instantiation of the FLASK architecture and is an implementation of the mandatory access controls (MAC) framework on Linux. SELinux enforces the access controls according to SELinux policy, which is loaded during system startup.
Each subject (process) and object (resource such as files, network resources, etc.) is labeled with a security context (also known as security label) that contains a type attribute. Most of the rules are made of SELinux contexts and used to determine whether an access is allowed or not, as defined in the policy. An access must be granted through SELinux policy rules. An allow statement of an SELinux rule is structured as follows:
where domain is a subject type, type is an object type, class is an object class, and permissions are a set of operations. This statement means that a domain (process) is allowed to perform an operation in permissions with a specific function supported by class on a type (target resource).
SEAndroid [5] is an implementation of SELinux for the Android Linux Kernel. The main features distinguishing SEAndroid from SELinux are the components added to the framework and Android-specific policy. SEAndroid adds an Android-specific policy tailored for the Android eigen components. SEAndroid labels app processes according to the SELinux security context. However, at the time policies are created, it is not known a priori which application will be installed on the system. Therefore, SEAndroid decides the security contexts of an application at its install-time. Currently, all the third-party applications are assigned after they are installed, as a single SELinux context: untrusted_app.
B. ANDROID DATABASE (SQLite)
Unlike most other Database Management Systems (DBMS) that use a client-server model, SQLite [6] does not have a separated processing server, but is an in-process library that implements an embedded SQL database engine. That is, SQLite is embedded into a program and does not support a multi-user database. The SQLite database is stored in and managed with a single file. This implies that anyone with access to the database file can read all database content.
Android provides a built-in SQLite database implementation. Similar to other files stored on the device's internal storage, Android maintains a database in private space. Because of the well-known ''Android Application Sandbox'' characteristic and other security features, one application cannot directly access the resources of other applications.
Each database is accessible only by the app that generated the database.
Android provides a way to share one app's database with other apps by using a characterful component, called a Content Provider. When a developer of an app wants to share the app's database with other apps, the developer implements a Content Provider associated with the app by defining a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) for the database. Android databases can be classified into two types: databases generated by third-party apps and databases generated by Android (such as contacts, calendar, and e-mail). Accessing a database of any type is managed by the corresponding Content Provider. However, access to a database generated by Android requires a permission defined in the Android Permission Set-acquiring permission is compelled by the Android Permission Framework-whereas access to a database generated by a third-party app does not require any permission (though user-defined permissions do exist, it is an optional feature).
C. TRUSTED EXECUTION ENVIRONMENT (TEE)
A Trusted Execution Environment [7] , [8] is a secure area of the main processor. It is isolated from a Rich Execution Environment (REE) (e.g., mobile OS) to protect assets such as cryptographic keys and user credentials. The TEE provides security features such as isolated execution, integrity of Trusted Applications (authorized security software which is loaded and executed in TEE) along with confidentiality of their assets. An attacker in the REE cannot access resources of TEE directly. Any direct access from the REE to the TEE is restricted by a hardware access-control mechanism. In general, the TEE offers an execution area that provides a higher level of security than a REE (e.g., mobile OS) and more functionality than a Secure Element (SE). The wellknown example of a TEE for embedded devices is ARM TrustZone. It is currently utilized to provide security-critical services.
D. ANDROID KEYSTORE
The Android KeyStore [9] stores cryptographic keys in a container to prevent the extraction of security materials from the device. The keys in the KeyStore can be used only through cryptographic operations while the keys are non-exportable. The KeyStore system may involve TEE (Trusted Execution Environment [7] , [8] e.g., ARM TrustZone Technology). To use this hardware based secure storage, a manufacturer's support is needed. If TEE is not available, the KeyStore system is implemented by a software. The KeyStore system is used by the Android KeyStore Provider (referred to below as AndroidKeyStore), which was introduced in Android API level 18. AndroidKeyStore interacts with the KeyStore service that interacts with Keymaster in TEE.
When an application generates a key using AndroidKeyStore, the key is stored in KeyStore under an alias. This alias is a string value defined by the app developer, and is used to identify the corresponding key. Keymaster is responsible for the cryptographic operations with keys linked to each Android app. However, the keys do not reside in the TEE area; they are stored in the files in the /data/misc/keystore/user_0 directory. These files are encrypted using a device-specific key in the TEE, of course, and their names are correlated with the user ID of the app and the app developer-defined alias.
III. RELATED WORK
As SELinux has become a distinguished security solution to control access using MAC, numerous studies has focused on database protection based on SELinux. For example, SeSQLite [10] provides additional access controls based on SELinux security policy. In particular, SeSQLite demonstrated that access control with minimal overhead on performance and size by integrating MAC into Android builtin SQLite is feasible. Its access control methods can control access through the corresponding DBMS. However, it can not prevent database content from being exposed to someone who can directly access the database file. Most database formats are already well known, so anyone with a database file can easily view the stored content. SeSQLite assumes that an Android app has its unique SELinux contexts and intends to make policy using this information for access control. However, it is difficult to configure the system in a manner that allows all apps to automatically have individual contexts at install-time. In fact, to the contrary, all third-party apps are assigned to a single SELinux context: untrusted_app.
Because FDE can not protect data during operation, all apps must individually prepare countermeasures to protect their data during operation; for example, external libraries such as SQLCipher [11] can be used. However, this type of remedy might limit interoperability because its configuration is only compatible within its domain. To construct a secure area isolated from an unsecured domain, Samsung KNOX [12] introduced a secured container on their Androidbased device. In the secured container, only approved apps can be executed and their data can be utilized within a secured domain only. Because of this, however, only a few selected apps can have the benefit of this protection.
Android KeyStore provides functionalities that protect key material from unauthorized use. Unfortunately, several vulnerabilities have been found. The work of [13] analyzed KeyStore with various options. From their results, even if KeyStore uses TEE, an attacker can use the keys of other app on the device by renaming the related files with the proper uid. The work of [14] discovered a problem in which the files generated by KeyStore exist even after the owner app is removed. Because of this, if a new app has the same uid as the removed app, the new app can use the keys of the removed app. However, this vulnerability was removed by Google.
IV. ATTACK MODEL AND ASSUMPTION
The main goal of an attacker is to disclose information in a database or manipulate database content without being detected. VOLUME 6, 2018
A. ATTACKER MODEL
As discussed in II-B, one app cannot directly access the resources of other apps under normal circumstances. The target database of an attacker belongs to a specific app (e.g., system or third-party app). Thus, the attacker needs some level of privilege to access the database. We assume that an attacker is able to acquire this capability by performing software attacks on the Android software stack.
In order to gain a permission or escalate the privileges for database access, an attacker attempts attacks on the higher layer of the Android software stack; attack types may include malicious apps [15] - [17] , confused deputy attacks [18] - [20] , and collusion attacks [21] , [22] . In addition, we assume that the attacker will launch attacks on the lower layer of the Android software stack. Previous studies have described various privilege escalation attacks on the lower layer of the Android software stack [16] , [23] . These attacks grant an attacker root privileges. A root attacker with root credentials can run apps with root privileges; in this case, all available permissions are inherited and the file system can be inspected at will. SELinux and SEAndroid have been included in recent Android versions; however, a root attacker can access the entire file system. An attacker is also assumed to have the ability to decompile and analyze Android Package Kit (APK) files to obtain information related to database operations. However, our attacker can not manipulate the memory space of the target process, which is protected by SELinux. Protecting the manipulation of the memory space can be achieved by applying an antidebugging technique to the target process or limiting the execution of memory access tools (e.g., gdb) and/or systemcalls (e.g., ptrace) with SELinux policy.
B. ASSUMPTIONS
We consider several assumptions as follows. 1) We assume an attacker cannot compromise the kernel (and bootloader also). An attack that compromises the kernel can take control of the entire system. However, there are several technologies designed to protect the kernel from malicious attacks. Secure Boot (also known as Trusted Boot) [24] guarantees the proper bootloader and kernel were loaded and run when the device was started. Real-time Kernel Protection [25] protects the kernel from attacks that exploit an already booted and running kernel. So, a kind of ''Evil Maid'' attack [26] , [27] is not feasible for attackers. 2) The KeyStore operates with a TEE. As mentioned in Section II-D, if a TEE is not available, the KeyStore system operates with a software implementation; however, we do not consider such software-based environments in our architecture. 3) We assume that there are no vulnerabilities in our added components. The extent of vulnerabilities (the number of defects) is relevant to the complexity of software [28] . Our components are functionally simple and have a relatively small amount of code, thus software vulnerabilities can be effectively removed through static and dynamic analyses. As a result, we assume there is no chance for attackers to acquire the privileges that our components have. 4) The memory space of a running app is not in the protection scope of our architecture. For an app to use the data stored in the database, the data must finally exist in the memory of the app in plaintext form. Thus, we do not consider an attacker who attempts to access the memory space of a running app. In a similar sense, data that are shared through a Content Provider are also not protected. If an app has permission to access a specific Content Provider, it can access database content that the owner wants to share. In a Content Provider scenario, we note that the database transaction is actually performed by the owner app. Thus, in a situation where the owner of the data has granted the access path through a Content Provider, we left the security of data provided by a Content Provider to the Android Permission Framework. In conclusion, we do not consider attacks through a legitimate app (the owner of database) operation. In addition to our assumption 4, UI attacks (such as stealing keystrokes [29] , [30] , phishing [30] , Activity hijacking [31] , clickjacking [30] , [32] , and capturing the screen during operation) are also beyond the scope of this paper.
V. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
This section describes an overview of our proposed architecture, and elaborates on each component and interaction in more detail. Our design provides security functionalities for a secure database, and operates in a transparent manner through minimal modification for app developers and users.
A. OVERVIEW Figure 3 represents an overview of our architecture. Unlike current SQLite database of Android, the database engine is not embedded into a specific app but rather into the native daemon, which is named sdbd (SecureDB Daemon). All the database transactions are performed by sdbd. To that end, related classes have been added to the Android framework, in order to pass requests generated by an app to sdbd and receive the results. sdbd acquires information of the connected app through data provided by the kernel. Based on this information, it creates and manages the database on the specified path of the app.
Our approach basically provides database confidentiality by using encryption. At the first initial booting time, sdbd requests a key generation to KeyStore. As mentioned in Section II-D, KeyStore generates a key (K sdbd ) for sdbd and encrypts K sdbd using a device-specific key (K device ) stored in the TEE. sdbd randomly generates an encryption key K database_app for each app and database pair, and K database_app is encrypted using K sdbd . Hence, the key hierarchy in the proposed architecture consists of three layers. The encrypted K database_app is stored in a meta-data file by sdbd. The resources managed by sdbd are protected by SELinux policy so that only a privileged subject (i.e., sdbd) can access them.
Whenever an app asks sdbd to perform a database transaction, sdbd authenticates the app. By verifying the app that requests a transaction, sdbd allows only an authorized app to access its database (App-binding). After app authentication, sdbd requests KeyStore to decrypt the encrypted K database_app in order to obtain K database_app . At this time, KeyStore also authenticates sdbd. If KeyStore verifies sdbd correctly, KeyStore decrypts the encrypted K sdbd using K device in the TEE. Thereafter, sdbd can perform a cryptographic operation through KeyStore while the related key (K sdbd ) is unknown to sdbd. In other words, K sdbd can only be used by sdbd, on the same device that has a corresponding device-specific key K device (Device-binding). Finally, sdbd performs the requested transaction using K database_app on the encrypted database and sends the result to the app. The key hierarchy procedure is depicted in Figure 4 .
In the proposed architecture, we also propose fine-grained access control over a database and KeyStore. As explained in Section I, the current Android uses uid for access control over a database and KeyStore, which might be insecure because multiple apps may have a single uid or an attacker might manipulate the uid. In our architecture, sdbd authenticates an app via the fingerprint of the app, and KeyStore authenticates sdbd via the fingerprint of sdbd. Such a fingerprint is unique information, which is generated using the runtime information of the object to be authenticated.
In the following, we explain the individual components that comprise the secure database architecture (see Figure 5 ). The overall operation flow is presented in Section V-F.
B. SELINUX POLICY
We leverage SELinux to protect our components and resources from unauthorized access. Although Android leverages the Linux kernel and SELinux is a security module available in the standard Linux kernel, SELinux has been modified specifically for Android.
The main difference is in the security label. Each process or object is labeled with a security label. In conventional SELinux, a security label takes the form of [user:role:type:mls_level] consisting of four different fields. However, only two fields, role and type, are actually used in AOSP (Android Open Source Project). The other fields are fixed; user is set to 'u' and mls_context to 's0'. The field role is always set to 'r' for domains (processes) or 'object_r' for objects. Thus, the type is the primary field for the access decisions.
In accordance with the SELinux implementation of Android, we define types for our components: 'sdbd' for domain, 'sdbd_data_file' and 'sdbd_exec' for object. We specify our domain, type definitions, and rules in the 'securedb.te' file. The rules are not complex. They are defined by 'allow' and 'neverallow' rules, which means that only the sdbd domain (some rules include 'init') can access (proper operation) objects that are labeled with 'sdbd_data_file' or 'sdbd_exec'. Additionally, rules for the use of KeyStore and Binder, and for limiting access with system-calls (such as ptrace) are defined. We also update several definition files (e.g., file_contexts, service_contexts, init.te, etc.) related to the operation of our components.
In addition, because sdbd communicates with PackageManager using the FILESYSTEM socket of UDS (Unix Domain Socket), we also define rules that allow only sdbd and system_server-PackageManager is executed in system_server process-to access the socket file.
C. KEYSTORE
The current Android KeyStore verifies the ownership of keys using an app's uid; thus, an app typically can not access other app's key. When an app attempts to access KeyStore by using an uid, KeyStore grants an access to all the keys corresponding to the uid. Because our root attacker can manipulate an uid, it is not secure for KeyStore to grant access to keys only using a uid.
In the proposed architecture, KeyStore generates and stores a cryptographic key for sdbd in the TEE area. To ensure that this key is only used upon a request from sdbd, KeyStore verifies the identity of the caller process (i.e., sdbd). As we mentioned above, a root attacker can control an uid and can request KeyStore to perform a cryptographic operation with a fabricated uid, e.g., the uid of sdbd. To prevent this attack, we modify KeyStore such that the trustlet (Keymaster new ) of KeyStore consists of three modules: Mode Decision, Caller Authenticator, and Keymaster old as shown in the right-hand box of Figure 5 . Keymaster old denotes the Keymaster of the current Android. 
2) CALLER AUTHENTICATOR
This module authenticates that the caller process is sdbd.
To that end, we utilize a hash value of runtime information, which is related to a portion of sdbd, as a fingerprint. In more detail, the hash value is computed using a code segment that contains sections holding machine instructions as well as sections holding certain read-only data. Accordingly, unless sdbd is not modified, the code segment of sdbd remains unchanged (see Figure 6 ). The fingerprint (hash value) is stored within an encrypted file that is managed by KeyStore.
Because KeyStore is able to know the pid of a caller process by itself, KeyStore passes the pid of the caller process to Keymaster new . Each time sdbd requests KeyStore to perform a cryptographic operation, Caller Authenticator accesses the memory space of the running process that matches to the pid and reads the code segment of the process. After calculating the hash value, Caller Authenticator checks if the hash value is identical to the stored fingerprint of sdbd. Only if two values (the calculated hash value and the stored fingerprint) are identical, the Caller Authenticator proceeds to Keymaster old . Keymaster old then performs the requested cryptographic operation.
D. SECUREDB DAEMON
The SecureDB daemon (denoted as sdbd) is the main component in our architecture. It is started by init when the device boots. sdbd is a system daemon and it communicates with Android apps and PackageManager using UDS. sdbd consist of four modules: App Authenticator, Meta-data Manager, Update Manager, and Database Manager.
1) APP AUTHENTICATOR MODULE
This module authenticates an app connected to sdbd. When a connection is initially established between an app and sdbd, sdbd verifies the identity of the app. Please recall that the code segment of sdbd is used when KeyStore authenticates sdbd. However, sdbd can not authenticate the connected app in the same manner.
Unlike programs on most other systems, Android apps do not have a single entry point (such as a main function); moreover, the class is loaded by a class loader at runtime if necessary, so we cannot guarantee that a portion of the process memory will be consistent at a specific point of time.
To authenticate an app in the proposed architecture, sdbd uses all of the executable format files (e.g., dex, odex, or oat files) and APK files, which are referenced by the app process. sdbd is able to know the pid of the connected app process by itself. Thus, using information provided by the kernel, sdbd can find the files referred to by the process that matches to the pid. sdbd calculates a hash value using the above-mentioned files and uses the hash value as a fingerprint of the app. Every app process should reference at least its own executable, and such structure is managed by the kernel. We assume that the kernel is not compromised, thus, such reference information is reliable. Because such a fingerprint is different for each app, it is used as an identification information of an app.
sdbd also checks that the caller is Android friendly, not a dummy created by an attacker; attackers who know the mechanism of App Authenticator attempt to create a fake process to defeat the verification procedure. We check whether the caller is Android-friendly by inspecting that the caller is a child process of zygote and that the memory is configured accordingly.
Only if all verifications by the App Authenticator are successful, a requested database transaction is performed by the Database Manager.
2) METADATA MANAGER MODULE
This module manages a meta-data file, which is related to the target application and its database. A meta-data file stores all data used for app authentication and VOLUME 6, 2018 database operations. This file is named in the following form in a specific path that is managed by sdbd:
[APP_UID]_[APP_PACKAGE_NAME].key. A meta-data file is generated by sdbd when an app requests opening a nonexistent database for the first time. Figure 7 shows a structure of a meta-data(.key) file. The K database_app , which is used for database encryption, is randomly generated by sdbd and the fingerprint of app is generated as described in Section V-D1. After all the content for the meta-data(.key) file is ready, it is finally encrypted by KeyStore with a key (K sdbd ) preserved in TEE.
3) DATABASE MANAGER MODULE
This module is in charge of database operations and communications with an app. When an app requests a database operation and if a corresponding meta-data file exists, the App Authenticator Module compares the fingerprint of the requesting app process with the stored fingerprint. If the authentication is successful, sdbd and the app share a random session key (SK) using the Diffie-Hellman method. Afterward, the entire communication is encrypted by the AES-CTR algorithm using SK. To perform operations on the database, an app generates an SQL query and transmits it to sdbd. sdbd performs the database transaction and returns the result to the app. If the query is a SELECT statement, a SecureCursorWindow is created, similar to a CursorWindow created by the Android database Cursor. The SecureCursowWindow is passed to the app as a SecureCursor, which manages the SecureCursorWindow. Unlike CursorWindow, the content of the SecureCursorWindow is encrypted using SK; thus, it can be decrypted only while the session is maintained.
A database key (DBKey) is required to perform transactions on an encrypted database. sdbd optionally supports user consent (e.g. password) for generating a DBKey. If user consent is not available, sdbd decrypts the metadata(.key) file through KeyStore to obtain K database_app and uses K database_app as a DBKey to work with the corresponding database. Otherwise, if user consent is available, the USR_KEY is derived from the user consent using the Key Derivation Function (KDF). The DBKey is obtained by XOR of K database_app and USR_KEY.
a: DATABASE ENCRYPTION STRATEGY
Numerous studies has been carried out on how to encrypt databases and how to efficiently search on encrypted databases. Considering the characteristics of the Android DBMS (SQLite), the encryption strategies, in accordance with the encryption scope, can be achieved at various levels: database, table, columns, rows, and attributes. And the encryption process can be performed at two levels: DBMS-level and Client-side (App)-level. In determining the encryption method, issues such as structure changes, content updates, searching on encrypted state, and performance should be considered.
In our architecture, database encryption is applicable regardless of the encryption strategies. Typically, the whole encryption method has low performance/high functionalities, and the attribute-based encryption method has the opposite features. In recent years, the performance overhead of the whole encryption method has been greatly reduced, owing to the continuing development of computing environments and DBMS designs that consider encryption. With the goal of constructing a transparent system to the existing database, we apply the whole encryption method to achieve a robust and stable database environment, and perform experiments based on this environment.
4) UPDATE MANAGER MODULE
Unlike our assumption that an update of a well-structured sdbd is not required (see Section VIII-A), updates of apps occur frequently. If an app is updated, the fingerprint of the app, which is used for authentication, will be changed. Thus, sdbd must renew the stored fingerprint in a meta-data file while an app is updated.
sdbd opens two types of sockets: one for apps, and one for PackageManager. The socket for apps is used to deal with database requests of an app. The socket for PackageManager is used to inform the update status for each other. While PackageManager updates an app, PackageManager connects to sdbd and informs which app is being updated.
Using a two-step process, sdbd checks the old app and the new app to determine whether it should allow an update of the stored fingerprint. First, sdbd checks through the Manifest file to determine whether the new app intends to use a secure database (permission) and whether the new app is an updated version of the old app (Package name and Version). Second, sdbd verifies that the two apps are signed with the same key. The signature and the Manifest file are already checked by PackageManager; however, sdbd autonomously checks them again. Because Android manages application information (including the certificate) in several files (e.g., packages.xml, packages.list), an attacker may attempt to update/replace the current app with another app regardless of the app signature by modifying such files and/or filesystem information. If sdbd is configured to receive a check result from PackageManager, the result can be compromised by attackers. Thus, in our architecture, sdbd and PackageManager operate independently of each other and only the information indicating the target app is passed from PackageManager to sdbd.
The update process of an app's fingerprint by sdbd is processed after the updated app already installed, so sdbd uses stored data in a meta-data file as information of the old app. After the signature and the Manifest check succeed, Update Manager updates the stored fingerprint and instructs PackageManager to continue its process.
E. INTERFACE AND PERMISSION
We implement APIs for database transaction that are mostly identical to the current Android SQLite APIs. The changed part is an 'open' API that has an added parameter, which is used to input a user-consent (e.g., user password). The secure database can work without user-consent, but user-consent provides stronger security.
Further, we add a permission for secure database named ''ACCESS_SECURE_DATABASE'' on Android Permission Set. Currently in Android, an app can access its owned database without permission. Permission is required to access any database that an app does not own. However, our permission is added for the purpose of privileges that handle access to the owned secure database. In Android, system permissions are divided into normal permissions and dangerous permissions depending on whether an app needs to access a user's private information. Existing permissions for accessing Android's default database(e.g., READ_CALENDAR, READ_CONTACTS, etc.) are classified as dangerous permissions; however, we classify our permission as a normal permission. The database content that is stored by an app might contain sensitive private data, such as that contained in Android's default database. However, whereas accessing Android's default database is a type in which a third-party app accesses a database created and managed by the system app, a secure database is a database that is created and managed by an app itself; thus, the app has ownership of the database.
Our permission has two roles; First, when PackageManager and sdbd check the Manifest during the app update phase, our permission instructs them to follow procedures for secure database. Second, our permission informs the user that the app uses a secure database. As a result, the developer can configure the app to use the secure database in a manner similar to the way it used the existing database, through a minimally changed API. Moreover, after permission is granted, the user can be assured that their data are securely stored via a secure database.
F. OPERATION FLOW
As shown in Figure 8 , the operation of our proposed architecture is divided into two phases: a Database Access Phase and an App Update Phase. Because the details of each entity's operations are already described in the sections for the individual components, this section briefly presents the sequence of operations to be performed in our architecture.
In the database access phase, an app attempts to access a database and requests queries to be executed over the database. At first, the app calls the open database API with a database name through the SecureDatabase class. The SecureDatabase class-because the instance of SecureDatabase class is included in the app, all app-side entries are hereinafter referred to as 'app'-tries to connect to sdbd internally. After the connection is established, the app sends a message to open a specific database. At this time, if this is the app's first request, sdbd generates a fingerprint of the app and stores related information in a metadata file. If a previous request from the app exists, sdbd verifies the fingerprint of the app. After checking whether the fingerprint match, sdbd and the app share a random session key (SK) using the Diffie-Hellman method. If the app receives a user-consent, it generates a USR_KEY using KDF and encrypts the USR_KEY using SK. It then sends the encrypted USR_KEY to sdbd. In the case of a first-time access request, sdbd generates a random key (K database_app ) and stores it to the meta-data file after encryption through KeyStore. Otherwise, sdbd decrypts the existing meta-data file through KeyStore and extracts K database_app corresponding to the target database. For every request to KeyStore, KeyStore authenticates sdbd. sdbd prepares a DBKey using the XOR of a USR_KEY and K database_app if USR_KEY exists; otherwise, it uses K database_app as a DBKey.
sdbd does not maintain the DBKey, as it is in memory. When one transaction is completed, sdbd removes the DBKey from its memory. sdbd maintains the DBKey in encrypted form through KeyStore. When the app requests an SQL query, sdbd restores the DBKey, performs the database transaction, and returns the query result to the app.
The app update phase is initiated by a notification from PackageManager. If the app that is to be updated declared a SecureDatabase permission in its Manifest, PackageManager VOLUME 6, 2018 connects to sdbd before finishing the update and informs sdbd which app is being updated. sdbd verifies that the new app is an update of the old app as described in Section V-D4. If the verification is successful, sdbd informs PackageManager to continue its process and replaces the old fingerprint with the new fingerprint. Otherwise, sdbd sets a flag indicating that the access is restricted.
VI. APPLICATION SIMILARITY
In the current system, Android verifies the signature and the package name of the two apps (updated app and installed app) before updating. However, if the developer is the same, the signatures of the apps are verified using the same certificate. Moreover, the package name is simply an alias assigned by the developer.
We believe that there might be several cases which suffer from current method and that current method is insufficient to identify an app in a strict manner. For example, a developer might want to change the package name of the published app. This can occur when the developer finds that the package name was mistyped, or when the client that ordered the app requests a change to a package name after the app is already live on the market. Previously, because the developer is the same, there are several techniques (e.g., same UID) that allow the new app to control the old app's database, which may already contain a significant amount of data. However, because our architecture only allows the owner app of the database to access its database, the new app can not access the database even if the app only changes its package name. In one more example, a developer publishes an app (denoted as A) and later revokes the publication of A from the market. Finally, he develops another app (denoted as B) that has the same package name as app A. In this case, A can be updated to B and B can access the database of A, even if the body of the app is completely different.
With consideration of the above cases, we propose a pilot method that compares similarity between two apps. The entire process of the proposed method proceeds in two steps. The first step checks the meta information of the two apps. It checks the sequence of the version between two apps, and verifies that the apps are signed with the same key. The second step calculates a similarity score between two apps, and decides whether the newer app is an updated version of the older app. This procedure will take a place in an update operation, so we need to apply a mechanism that is completed within an acceptable time. The idea that the code bases of the original app and the updated app may be similar was what motivated us to check app similarity. Owing to the nature of an app's structure, the resources (e.g., images, layouts, audio, etc.) can be changed entirely. Therefore, we focused on the instruction codes inside an app. We collect instruction sequences from an app and then utilize them for footprint generation. The footprint is used to compare the similarity between two apps. From now on, we explain our proposed procedure with an assumption that our similarity method is integrated into our database architecture.
Each Android app contains a few dex file, which contains the actual Dalvik bytecode for execution. The Dalvik bytecode consists of opcodes and operands; however, we collect only the opcodes (two-byte hex values) on a method-bymethod basis in each class. Afterward, we add instruction sequences to the BloomFilter [33] . A BloomFilter is a probabilistic data structure that is used to test whether an element is a member of a set. While it is a space-efficient data structure, there exists the probability of false positives. The factors that affect the probability of false positives are the length of the BloomFilter (m), the number of hash functions (k), and the number of elements in a set (n). Under the same conditions, the longer the BloomFilter length and the smaller the number of elements, the lower the rate of false positives.
Each class has a different number of methods. Thus, the use of a fixed-length BloomFilter for an app may create space inefficiencies or result in a greater-than-expected rate of false positives. The length of the BloomFilter should be determined with consideration for both the rate of false positives and the number of elements.
The probability of false positives F is determined as follows [34] :
Thus, the length of the BloomFilter (m) can be represented with the following formula:
We have fixed the false positive rate F at 0.001 and the number of hash functions k at 4. Thus, the length of BloomFilter (m) is determined by the number of elements n. Some classes in an app may have very few methods and the updated version of a corresponding class may have a significantly increased number of methods. In this case, the false positive rate of BloomFilter might be significantly increased, because the BloomFilter length is not sufficient. Thus, we set the minimal number of methods in a class at 50. In addition, we set the BloomFilter length to be that corresponding to 1.5 times the actual number of methods, taking into consideration the false positives that might occur when methods are added in the class of the updated app.
To check the similarity, we have to calculate the similarity scores of the original app and the updated app. We use the Jaccard similarity coefficient [35] method for measuring the similarity score. The intuition, from the perspective of code size, is that the size of the instruction sequences of the method seems equal to the proportion occupied by that method in the entire program. The differences between the original code and the updated code can be represented using three alteration types: 1) addition of elements (e.g., class or method), 2) deletion of elements, and 3) modification of elements. However, in the end, regardless of the alteration type, the alterations cause a gap between the two apps and the proportion of the gap represents the degree of changes to the app. That is, the proportion of the same instruction sequences between two apps can eventually represent a similarity between them.
Our method uses BloomFilter to check whether the same instruction sequences exist in both the original app and the updated app. Our proposed mechanism is shown in Figure 9 . The footprint of the original app is created when the app first attempts to access sdbd. sdbd extracts smali code from the app's dex files and collects instruction sequences for each method in a class. Then, to add an element to BloomFilter, sdbd feeds the instruction sequences to hash functions to obtain k array positions, and sets the bits at all these positions to 1. sdbd stores the BloomFilter in a meta-data(.fp) file in conjunction with the class name, digest of class, and the size of the instructions. A .fp file is not encrypted like .key file. Instead, sdbd calculates a MAC (Message Authentication Code) value using keyed-hash algorithms and a MAC key stored in the .key file; it then stores the MAC value at the end of the .fp file. Once an updated app is installed, sdbd extracts smali code from the updated app and collects instruction sequences for each method in a class again. sdbd gets a k array positions through keyed-hash functions and, if all of the bits at these positions are equal to 1, then it decides that the instruction sequences exist in the original app.
In the meantime, sdbd also calculates the size of instruction sequences, which is determined as the same, and computes the similarity score between two apps. To obtain the similarity score, sdbd computes the Jaccard similarity coefficient as follows.
where M Ci ORI is a set of methods that are composed of instruction sequences in class Ci (0 < i ≤ the number of classes in original app), M Cj UPD is a set of methods that are composed of instruction sequences in class Cj (0 < j ≤ the number of classes in updated app), and Ck is a class in Ci∪ Cj (0 < k ≤ the number of classes in Ci ∪ Cj).
VII. EVALUATIONS A. SECURITY ANALYSIS 1) BRUTE FORCING
Our proposed architecture uses encryption to ensure the confidentiality of database and meta-data file. In our prototype implementation, we used AES-128 and AES-256 algorithm.
An attacker can try a brute-force attack to find out database encryption key. However, it is not feasible in reality. There is a physical argument, which is called Landauer limit, that a 128-bit symmetric key is computationally secure against brute-force attack [36] . And also, for example, breaking a symmetric 256-bit key (in case of AES-256) by brute force requires 2 128 times more computational cost than a 128-bit key. If there is a supercomputer that could check a billion billion (10 18 ) AES keys per second, it requires about 3×10 51 years to exhaust the 256-bit key space in theory. There are also researches on a cryptographic 'break', which is faster than a brute-force attack [37] - [39] . But even now, these still are not effective against AES. NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) presented that AES-128 is fine at the very least up to 2030 [40] . Alternatively, an attacker can attempt to guess the password (if a user-consent is used to generate USR_KEY). Such attempts should be an online guessing attack. An offline guessing attack is not feasible, because an attacker can not immediately verify that the keys he found are correct (DBKey = K database_app ⊕ USR_KEY). Furthermore, the current mobile OSes delay authentication for a specific seconds after a few failed password attempts. They also support data protection that erases all data on a device after a few failed password attempts. If we adopt such technique which can be used to mitigate password guessing attempts, the possibilities of brute-force on password can be significantly reduced. On a single core of an Intel i7-2600, PBKDF2 with 2,000 iteration count is able to calculate approximately 513 ± 2 keys per second. Custom hardware (e.g., FPGA/GPU arrays) can make a offline attack more efficient. However, on a mobile device (our test device Nexus 5X) requires 68 ± 3 ms to calculate a single key. This shows that the guessing attack becomes 35 times slower than PC environment.
2) CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY
We do not designate a specific strategy of database encryption in our architecture. A database encryption strategy can be chosen flexibly according to the functionalities that are required. Thus, we assume that the security of the database encryption strategy depends on the secrecy of the key. To disclose information in a database or manipulate database content without being detected, an attacker must obtain proper keys.
The cryptographic algorithms and the keys that are used for database encryption are based on the assumption that the used algorithms do not have structural vulnerabilities and that the keys have sufficient security strength.
The security of the database key can be observed in three aspects [13] .
• Device-binding : The key can only be used on the device that generated the key.
• App-binding : The key can only be used by an instance of a certain app that generated the key. It should not be used by another app.
• User-consent required : The key can only be used when a user gives his explicit consent to use the key. (e.g., when a user inputs a password)
Due to our assumption that KeyStore uses TEE, Devicebinding is always guaranteed. While the current KeyStore has vulnerabilities that can allow an attacker to use it as a cryptographic operation oracle, our KeyStore verifies the caller before an operation. If an attacker tries to access KeyStore after modifying or manipulating sdbd, KeyStore will detect an abnormal situation and deny the access. Thus, the attacker can not use the key in KeyStore, as well as he can not gain access to the key. Similarly, because sdbd verifies the caller app before operation, our security architecture guarantees App-binding. The verification utilizes all files that are related to the running app, and not the exchanged message; thus, an attacker cannot access sdbd to perform a malicious activity, even if only a small part of the app has been modified. User-consent is a stronger requirement than App-binding, so an attacker who can not break App-binding also cannot break User-consent. If User-consent is used on a secure database, the attacker cannot access the database even when he reveals the K database_app . However, there is a risk even when User-consent is provided: i.e., a malicious app developer. If the app developer is malicious, he can access a database at any time and capture the user-consent value. This is a serious problem in view of user privacy. However, because the database is owned by an app created by a malicious developer, the app has full control of the database and its content. The issue of a malicious app developer is beyond the scope of this paper and we do not consider it here.
Our method utilizes UDS for peer communication. As we described in V-C and V-D, KeyStore and sdbd use the pid to designate an opposite peer. The work of [41] checks that the peer credentials (PID, UID, and GID) are used to authenticate a peer for secure usage of UDS against non-root attackers. Similarly, ours obtains the pid through peer credentials of UDS and generates fingerprints based on the pid. However, the mechanism that provides credentials of the peer is internal to the kernel, and we assume the kernel is not compromised. Therefore, even a root attacker can not spoof the credentials of UDS.
The query result that is passed from sdbd to the app is encrypted with a session key (SK). This session key is changed every time that an app tries to open the database. The session key is generated by a key agreement algorithm, which is based on a randomly chosen value by each of the two entities. Therefore, even when a session key used for a specific session is exposed, it has no effect on the security of other session keys.
3) DATABASE KEY HIDING sdbd uses DBKey to perform transactions on a secure database. Thus, due to optimization issues, sdbd must keep the DBKey in memory to process continuous requests from the app. If the DBKey is present in memory as it is, the attacker has a chance to obtain the key material. Physical memory access can be used to acquire DBKey, which is held in main memory (e.g., DMA [42] , [43] , cold boot [44] ). If an attacker can take full RAM dumps, he has a chance to locate the key material in large amounts of data [45] , [46] .
To mitigate these types of risks, we keep the DBKey in memory in an encrypted form. When an app requests sdbd to transact an SQL query, sdbd requests KeyStore to decrypt the encrypted DBKey, in order to obtain the DBKey. As soon as the database transaction is completed, the DBKey is immediately deleted from memory by zeroing key material.
However, our method still has a limitation because the key exists in the memory as a plaintext even if a period is a very short moment. There are several countermeasures to protect materials against memory attacks. One way keeps the key inside the CPU rather than in RAM (e.g., AESSE [47] , TRE-SOR [48] , LoopAmnesia [49] ). Another way is encrypting RAM [50] . There is also a way that uses both techniques (e.g., Intel SGX(Software Guard Extension) Memory Encryption Engine [51], Apple's Secure Enclave [52] ).
4) IMPERSONATE AS A GENUINE
To access database content or a database key, an attacker must bypass the verification phase or pretend to be a genuine entity. Because the database is encrypted by a DBKey and the DBKey is encrypted by KeyStore (which includes TEE), there is no other means to touch the database or keys without following our process. Even if an attacker tries to manipulate sdbd, it will always incur changes-no matter how small the change is-to sdbd. During the verification process, KeyStore will detect this modification which is not allowed. Alternatively, the attacker has to manipulate the fingerprint stored by the KeyStore in TEE; however, REE does not have direct access to TEE and there is no mechanism to control the fingerprint on the REE side. Thus, the attacker cannot defeat the verification phase of KeyStore.
Similarly, if an attacker manipulates an app and tries to pass the verification of sdbd, sdbd also detects that the app was modified in an abnormal way. The attacker has to either modify the fingerprint stored in the meta-data file, or renew the fingerprint with one of the malformed app through the app update process of sdbd. In order to modify the fingerprint stored in the meta-data file, the attacker should decrypt/encrypt the meta-data file through KeyStore. However, only sdbd can decrypt the meta-data file through KeyStore. To renew the fingerprint with the one of the malformed app, the attacker would have to perform the app update process of sdbd. However, the attacker can neither generate the correct signature nor modify the public key that is stored in the meta-data file.
B. PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS
This section summarizes several experimental results on our prototype implementations and explain the performance impact on the device. The measurements were performed on a LG Nexus 5X running a hexa-core 1.8 GHz processor with 2 GB of RAM. The device was loaded with AOSP 7.1.1(Build Number:N4F26I), which included our implementations.
1) SQL OPERATION
First of all, to evaluate the performance impact on query processing, we executed a series of experiments comparing our implementations with both a base SQLite and a full database encryption solution named SQLCipher [11] . SQLCipher is an extension to the SQLite library that provides transparent 256-bit AES encryption of database files. We used the AES-CBC algorithm with 128-bits key to encrypt a metadata file and generate a fingerprint with the SHA-256 hash function. In order to evaluate the overhead of our architecture that is independent of the database encryption strategies, we adopted SQLCipher for our database encryption solution.
SQLite provides a performance test suite named speedtest1 [53] to benchmark the library. Because SQLCipher is an extension of SQLite, it also provides a performance test suite [54] . However, we did not use such a test suite, because the main focus of our experiments is not the performance of DBMS. As we mentioned above, our architecture is scalable because it is independent of database encryption strategies. The concern is overhead caused by our architecture, and thus we built our own test suite and environment for the experiments.
In our implementations, the verification of KeyStore against sdbd is not involved, because it is very difficult to implement modified trustlet in TEE on real devices without the support of the manufacturer. We note that KeyStore is not modified like the proposal in our experiments; hence, the operations of KeyStore is the same as the existing one. Instead, to reduce the gap between our proposal and the experiments, we added operations that read a memory and operate hash function with the same target (sdbd) in our implementation. The only difference is that the location of VOLUME 6, 2018 the operation is TEE in our proposal, but is REE in our implementation.
We implemented an Android app to measure the performance of SQL at the app level. Table 1 shows the overhead introduced by the basic SQL operations in our implementation. Compared with SQLCipher (we adopted SQLCipher for our database solution), the Open operation consumes about 350 ms more time. This overhead is caused by our authentication procedure, the app authentication of sdbd and caller authentication of KeyStore, and the key sharing procedure between an app and sdbd. Although this overhead is significant, Open occurs only one time when an app tries to access a database. For other operations, our proposed implementation requires a constant additional CPU time of about 10 ms. This overhead is caused by the caller authentication of KeyStore and secure communication through UDS. Basically, a single SQL transaction is a swift operation, so it seems that there exist considerable numerical differences in performance. However, the overhead, which is caused in our architecture, is a constant so we can enjoy security benefits with an additional time of about 10 ms. The mobile database environments do not deal with a heavy amount of transactions unlike a database servers; therefore, most users will not perceive the difference in performance between the existing database and ours. We discuss this issue in Section VIII. The structural nature of our architecture overview may cause concerns about bottlenecks resulting from several processes attempting to simultaneously access the database. Thus, we performed a kind of stress-test. We measured the CPU time of each method while increasing the number of processes that access the database, and compared the variations of processing time based on the the performance in Table 1 . Recent mobile devices support multitasking, but offers only limited multitasking that differs from traditional multitasking experienced in PC environments. We considered that there might be only a few simultaneous tasks that will access the database, so we performed experiments while increasing the number of processes up to 10. Figure 10 shows the comparison results. The variations in processing time are within ± 5ms. Compared with other methods, it can be seen that the variations caused by increases in the number of processes are within the overhead that occurs in multi-process environments (or within the error range of measurement), as in other methods. Therefore, the overhead caused by concurrent access can be considered as negligible.
2) APPLICATION SIMILARITY
In order to generate and compare the footprints of two apps, we need to extract instruction sequences from .dex files. We use a popular Dalvik disassembler, baksmali [55] , to reverse .dex into Dalvik bytecode. Most recent version of baksmali do not work on Android because the Java included in Android is a version that does not yet full support Jcommander. Thus, we used the 2.1.3 version of baksmali for our experiments.
We collected 1,500 apps from APKMirror. 1 We also collected five versions of each app. Some version sequences are continuous, whereas others are discontinuous. For five versions of one app, we performed a similarity comparison for all possible version pairs. Because we have five versions of each app, the experiments were performed on 10 pairs for each app. Figure 11 shows the distribution of our similarity experiment results. Figure 11 (a) shows the similarity scores of all comparison pairs as a point chart; Figure 11 (b) shows the frequency distribution and relative frequency for each similarity score section. As a result of comparing the similarity of the apps, the similarity scores between successive versions recorded mostly high values. The scores between most of the non-consecutive versions were also found to be higher than a certain level. The average similarity score was presented as 0.7315. With all the comparison pairs, we empirically found that the threshold 0.65 is a good balance to infer whether or not an app is an updated version. Our experiments show that over 70.13% of all comparison pairs have a similarity score of higher than 0.65; thus, by applying such a threshold, our method can autonomously decide whether the new app is an updated one.
We manually analyzed several app pairs that recorded abnormally low scores or abnormally high scores. By looking further into the low score cases, we noticed that one main contributing factor was obfuscation; that is, previous versions of some apps were not obfuscated but were found to be obfuscated in the updated version. Moreover, in the case of a major update with a significant number of modifications, the similarity also recorded a low score. For the high score cases, it was determined that an app only changed other resources or changed some operands in the code. In these cases, very few showed a 1.0 similarity score. Further, we created our own additional cases to represent app update scenarios that were not found in the app samples we collected, and found high similarity scores. For example, DexProtector [56] , one of the Android obfuscation tools, provides a function called class encryption, which encrypts an existing app's dex file and creates a new dex file to decrypt the encrypteddex. Thus, the similarity presents a high score because the instruction sequences of the new dex file are almost the same. We added some check rules for several unusual cases and processed them to request a user approval.
In order to consider a more practical environment, we did not separate obfuscated and non-obfuscated apps in our experiments. In practice, almost all the apps that were not obfuscated recorded high similarity scores. For obfuscated apps, we expected low similarity score; however, we observed a higher similarity score distribution than we expected. Similarity comparison results will vary considerably depending on what obfuscation options are applied, but our results show that apps were somewhat similar to each other even if they were obfuscated. We presume that app developers might intend to apply very limited obfuscation options because obfuscated code occasionally causes unexpected errors or leads to significant performance overhead. Based on our brief analysis of obfuscated apps, it appears that most apps only applied minimal protection, which obfuscated the names of classes, fields and methods. We measured the elapsed time for similarity checks; the results are shown in Table 2 . The elapsed time is relevant to the size of the target and the number of smali files. The size of the dex file is relatively small compared to that of the APK file. However, the whole process cannot be completed as quickly as most real-time tasks. When users launch an app, they expect it to run without a delay. Thus, we propose integrating this process in the update procedure. Users might have more tolerant attitudes for spending more time on an update.
VIII. DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS

A. UPDATE OF sdbd
In general, when a hash value is used to ensure that the target is not modified, the main challenge is how to deal with the update of the target. If sdbd is updated, the code segment is changed; thus, an identity check using a cryptographic hash will be failed. However, we have reason to believe that there is no need to update sdbd given that sdbd acts like a gateway for database transactions. Its functionalities can be defined clearly and the operation process is not complex, so if we initially construct sdbd as well-structured, the update is unnecessary unless the architecture is changed. Nonetheless, if an update of sdbd is required, the update of the hash value can be done by verifying the signature of updated sdbd, which is signed with the manufacturer's private key in TEE. This is because the public key is already maintained in a device for several reasons (e.g., firmware updates) and only the manufacturer can generate a correct signature that corresponds to the public key.
B. LEGITIMATE USE OF SHARED USER ID
In our architecture, we only allow the owner app of a database to access its database. Current Android controls an access for resources (e.g., files) based on the Linux uid of an app, which can be shared if apps are signed by the same key and the developer requests it. One concern is that there may be apps that legitimately use this feature for sharing data. It may seem that our architecture pushes the security of sharing the data from the system to the app, which negates the functionalities of the system. However, the shared user ID facility is not recommended for non-system apps. Above all, the owner app's data can be modified by other app and the owner app may not realize that the modification has been made. This is not desirable in the view of consistency. If a developer wants to share data stored in a secure database, he could worked around using Content Provider. A secure database is designed to protect the private data of the owner app and is incorporated as an optional feature in Android. Thus, if a developer wants to share data via a shared user ID, he can still use the existing database facility.
C. DECLARING PERMISSION
We defined a permission in our architecture: ACCESS_ SECURE_DATABASE. This permission was added on Android Permission Set, and it is checked by PackageManager and sdbd to handle operations for secure databases. It also informs the user that the app uses a secure database.
Several researches showed that many developers add unnecessary permissions to their applications [57] , [58] .
Thus, in some cases a permission is declared but the application does not use permission-related feature. However, this issue is beyond the scope of this paper and we do not consider such developer here. We assume that the developer has a good knowledge of the permission system and is well-trained. Thus, if a developer declares our permission, we deem that the developer properly uses a secure database in the application.
D. VOLUME OF MOBILE DATABASE TRANSACTIONS AND APPLICATION RESULT
In Section VII-B1, we described that ''The mobile database environment does not deal with a heavy amount of transactions unlike a database server''. Because we can not find supporting evidence in the public domain, we collected data for measuring the number of database transactions in mobile devices. We can make Android collect a database transaction log by declaring a property. The command is as follows: ''setprop db.log.slow_query_threshold [time]''. This command makes the system log all queries whose elapsed time is greater than the value of the [time] parameter. We set the [time] parameter as 0 (zero); as a result, all database queries are logged by the system. This command needs root privileges. So, we collected logs for a week from several rooted devices, which are used for daily activities. All the devices contain various apps (such as messengers, games, schedulers, etc.), although the devices did not all contain the same apps.
As we expected, the number of queries on mobile devices is not large. To show that our overhead is acceptable, we arranged the logs and examined the number of queries per second. The amount of time needed to perform database transactions is only a small fraction of the total daily usage time. In the maximum cases, the number of queries is about 50 per second, which consist of a combination of basic SQL statements (Insert, Select, Update, and Delete). This result shows that our overhead is acceptable for daily mobile use and all queries can be performed within the necessary time.
However, it appears that a few apps utilize their own database libraries, not a database that is provided by the system. Thus, the number of queries that occur in the entire system might be greater than that stated in our report. In addition, when an app tries a significant number of transactions continuously (e.g., copying a significant amount of data from an existing database to a secure database), the app might suffer from the overhead of our architecture.
To examine the effect of applying our proposal to real apps, we conducted further experiments. We prepare two devices of the same model; one has apps that use Android default database on the AOSP build (Device A), and the other has the same apps that use our database architecture on the modified AOSP build (Device B). Because we developed our proposal as an optional feature, we have to decompile, analyze, modify, and repackage the target apps in order to apply our proposal to current apps. Such series of operation are not easy if an app is obfuscated, and might cause an error because the decompiling and repackaging are not guaranteed to work perfectly. To choose apps for experiment, we looked for apps that use Android database from free and open source applications [59] , [60] . We select 3 apps (Telegram [61], K-9 Mail [62] , PocketMaps [63] ) and modify the source code in order to make them use our architecture. After preparing two experimental devices, we let 30 people use both devices for 5 minutes each, in any order. And we asked them to responde by choosing one of the three options; 1) The first one seems to be slower than the second, 2) The second one seems to be slower than the first, 3) I could not feel the difference in performance. The 23 out of 30 people responded with a third option, 2 people answered that the device A is slower, and 5 people answered that the device B is slower. Based on our experiments, we believe that our overhead does not significantly affect the UX(user experience) of ordinary persons in real-world app environments. In 1968 Robert Miller described orders of magnitude of computer mainframe responsiveness [64] ; 1) A response time of 100 ms is perceived as instantaneous, 2) Response times of 1 second or less are fast enough for users to feel they are interacting freely with the information. And for a long time, many researches have reported a latency related on human perception. However, the reported lowest latency is not necessary in our case. If the latency does not increase as to be distinguishable or inconvenient to the user, it is enough for us.
The query performance of our architecture, which is shown in Section VII-B1, is the result of a query process that batches a single query into a single transaction. Unless executed in a transaction scope, every operation will occur within its own transaction, which results in a slowdown of several orders of magnitude. Thus, if we use transactions (BEGIN...COMMIT) to wrap multiple insert/update/delete operations, the actual overhead can be less than that reported in this paper.
Our architecture can be used by current Android apps as we described above, however, some apps might not be work properly due to our architecture. The representative example is a backup app. A backup app have to back up app data that exists in an app's private directory. Whether or not the device is rooted, such backup app will back up a database as in encrypted. Because a backup app can not back up a database encryption key, a restored app can not access its database even if it is successfully restored. So an app, which uses Secure Database, should provide its own backup method.
E. APP SIMILARITY METHOD
Our proposed similarity method, using parameters we chose, showed the result that over 70.13% of all app comparison version pairs have a similarity score greater than 0.65. This means that the results for the remaining 30% of the apps represent false negatives. As we mentioned in Section VII-B2, the main factor that causes false negatives is the obfuscation technique. In fact, the comparison result, which used only non-obfuscated apps and same parameters, shows that about 97% of the pairs have a similarity score that can be decided as updated. However, we believe that this is not a meaningful result. The number of developers who apply the obfuscation technique to protect their software and rights is increasing. Accordingly, the number of obfuscated apps is also increasing. Therefore, in order to consider a more practical environment, we did not separate obfuscated apps and non-obfuscated apps in our experiments.
There are additional limitations in our method and experiments. First, our app collection was comprised of free apps and did not include paid apps. Because of that, the rate of non-obfuscated apps that exists in our test set might be greater than in practice. Second, we do not include the native libraries of the apps. The cost of analyzing native binaries is commonly very expensive-more professional tools and analysis time would be needed. Thus, if we include the target of native binaries, we can not compare similarity within an acceptable overhead. However, we expect that future improvements in our method, which will include the consideration of native libraries and of several deobfuscation techniques, will provide higher accuracy than that reported in this paper.
F. EXTENSION TO OTHER PLATFORMS
Our proposed architecture for a secure database environment can be considered to apply on other platforms. For example, iOS has adopted per-file encryption strategy with hardware security features [52] , however, it seems that a file could be decrypted using hardware crypto engine as a cryptographic operation oracle. The ''per-file'' key, which is used to encrypt the file, is wrapped with one of 4 class keys, and all wrapped per-file key handling occurs in a co-processor called the Secure Enclave (see [52] ). The class key, which is used to encrypt the per-file key, is protected with the hardware key-UID (device unique ID; only the device itself knows) and GID (device group ID; it is common to all processors in a class of devices)-and, for some classes, the user's passcode (if user have set). Though all attack attempts have to run on the device itself, if an attacker acquires proper privilege in specific conditions (unlocked state), there are chances that an attacker can access a file in abnormal way [65] - [67] . As a result, iOS might also lead to the same situation that we are concerned about in this paper. Our method can help to strengthen the data protection by allowing the access to data only through owner app.
Our architecture can be extended to other platforms, which have a vulnerability that an attacker can access database contents through illegal access path. The work of extension to other platform might require some modification of our system to make ours suitable for the target. However, it would be for a platform-dependent parts, not for the structure of proposed architecture. To extend our architecture to other platforms, there are several requirements for a target platform; 1) The support of the hardware-based secure environment, 2) Unix-similar process management system (Process Isolation, Inter-Process Communication), 3) Mandatory Access Control. If such requirements are satisfied on a platform, our method can be applied without major changes on the structure of architecture.
IX. CONCLUSION
Android database is a well-structured data storage system, and therefore most apps utilize it as their private data warehouse. However, previous database systems in Android have been exposed to several risks that unexpectedly disclosed database content. App developers have to autonomously consider and respond to the security of their own stored data.
In this paper, we presented an architecture for a secure database environment on Android. Our architecture provides database confidentiality by allowing only the authorized entity to access the corresponding database. Only sdbd can access the unique key in TEE and only the authorized app can request a transaction to sdbd. Thus, with such a verification chain method, only the app with ownership rights over the data can access the database.
Our method was designed to operate transparently on the current system and is friendly to developers and users. Although we introduced an architecture on Android in this paper, we expect that our approach can be applied to mobile OSes other than Android. 
